Erasing an end user's data
The runbook for a deletion / right-to-erasure request concerning one of your tenant’s customers (an end user — the person who clicked a Connect Link). Store by store, in the order that leaves nothing orphaned. Not legal advice; what your obligations are is between you, your counsel and your regulator — this page is about what the software holds and how to remove it.
Where an end user’s data can live
Section titled “Where an end user’s data can live”| Store | What it holds | Removed by |
|---|---|---|
end_users |
Email, display name, encrypted PII blob (name / phone / address / personal ID) | Step 1 |
credentials (connections) |
Encrypted OAuth tokens for their platform accounts | Step 1 with cascade |
resources (data-store cache) |
Synced business records from their platforms | Connection-delete cascade (automatic) |
resource_tombstones |
One row per deletion: vertical, platform, connection id, resource type and id, time. No record contents | Kept: it is the delete feed destinations read |
Read-only SQL views (os_analytics*, Postgres) |
Views over resources, not copies |
Nothing to do: they reflect a deletion as soon as it commits |
| Native dashboards | Aggregates over resources |
Nothing to do: cached for at most 60 s |
| Embedded Superset | Query results in Superset’s cache; charts and datasets hold no rows | Ages out with Superset’s cache (5 minutes in the shipped config) |
| Destinations: Postgres, Snowflake, BigQuery, Databricks | Exported copies of records | Applied automatically from the tombstones on the destination’s next run — see Destinations |
| Destinations: Parquet files (S3, GCS, Azure) and Iceberg tables | Exported copies of records, in files | Not removed by OpenSteward — see Destinations |
sync_jobs |
Connection id + sync progress | Connection-delete cascade (automatic) |
connection_external_accounts |
Platform account ↔ connection mapping | Connection-delete cascade (automatic) |
connect_sessions |
Link label, expiry, consumed-at; end-user FK | Detached (nulled) automatically at step 1 — the session row itself is your audit trail and carries no PII |
end_user_tokens (eut_…) |
Their MCP token hashes | Step 2 |
webhook_deliveries.body |
Outbound event JSON — can embed their email and connection detail | Step 3 (retention) or manual |
inbound_events.payload |
Raw platform webhooks — can embed their order/customer data verbatim | Step 3 (retention) |
| Provider-side OAuth grant | Their consent, recorded at Shopify/Stripe/etc. | Step 4 — manual, not performed by OpenSteward |
| Your log pipeline | Structured lines (pii_reveal, request logs) |
Step 5 — your infrastructure, out of the app’s reach |
Step 1 — delete the customer, with the connection cascade
Section titled “Step 1 — delete the customer, with the connection cascade”One call removes the customer record and every connection their links produced, which fires the standard connection-delete cascade: cached resources, sync jobs and external-account links all drop with it.
# Developer surface (Bearer key, scope customers:write):curl -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \ "$BASE/v1/customers/<id>?cascade=connections"
# Operator surface (X-Admin-Secret):curl -X DELETE -H "X-Admin-Secret: $ADMIN_SECRET" \ "$BASE/admin/end-users/<id>?cascade=connections"Without ?cascade=connections, only the end_users row is removed
and every connection stays live.
That is almost never what an erasure request means.
The encrypted PII blob is hard-deleted with the row. Each connection delete
is recorded in the audit log (connection.delete, under the system user
when it originates in integration-server).
The connection delete writes a connection-scope tombstone into the delete
feed, which is how the removal reaches your destinations (below).
Step 2 — revoke their MCP tokens
Section titled “Step 2 — revoke their MCP tokens”Admin → Customers → the customer → MCP tokens → Revoke, for any eut_…
token they held (or DELETE /admin/end-user-tokens/:id). Token rows are
hashes — nothing personal is recoverable from them — but a live token is
live access, so revoke before you consider the request closed.
Step 3 — bound the webhook payload stores
Section titled “Step 3 — bound the webhook payload stores”Delivered webhook bodies and raw inbound payloads are pruned by two runtime
settings (Admin → Settings → Webhooks), both 0 (keep forever) until you
say otherwise:
webhooks.delivery_retention_days— delivered/dead outbound bodies. Pending deliveries are never pruned. 30 is a sensible value.webhooks.inbound_event_retention_days— raw inbound platform payloads.
The sweep runs about every six hours. With retention configured, a deleted customer’s residue in these stores ages out on that schedule; if a request demands immediate removal, set the value low, wait one sweep, and restore it.
Step 4 — revoke the provider-side grant
Section titled “Step 4 — revoke the provider-side grant”Deleting a connection does not call the platform to revoke its OAuth grant — the provider-side consent survives until the refresh token dies or someone revokes it at the source. For a full erasure, revoke it in the platform’s own console (e.g. Shopify → Apps, Google → Security → Third-party access), or have the end user do so. This is the one step that cannot be automated uniformly today.
Step 5 — your own pipelines
Section titled “Step 5 — your own pipelines”Anything outside the application’s databases is yours to sweep: container
logs (PII reveals are logged as structured pii_reveal events by design),
log aggregators, backups, CSV/NDJSON exports operators downloaded from the
data viewer (each one is in the audit log as data.export, with who and
which connection), and whatever a BI tool connected through SQL access has
copied into its own storage. A backup taken before the erasure still contains
the data — apply your backup-retention policy accordingly
(backup-restore).
Destinations
Section titled “Destinations”A destination holds a copy outside OpenSteward, so erasure depends on its type. Every delete path (connection delete, record delete, a full sync finding a record gone, an operator clearing the cache) writes a tombstone, and the next export run forwards it. Check the destination’s run history for a successful run after the delete before you close the request; a disabled destination does not run, and applies nothing until it is enabled again.
- Postgres and warehouse loaders (Snowflake, BigQuery, Databricks) apply
the tombstones as deletes: rows covered by the tombstone whose
changed_atis not after itsdeleted_at. A connection-scope tombstone removes that connection’s rows from every table the destination has written. Your warehouse’s time travel and fail-safe still keep earlier versions for their configured retention; that is part of your warehouse’s erasure story, not OpenSteward’s. - Parquet files in object storage, and Iceberg tables, are immutable.
OpenSteward never rewrites or deletes a file it has written. The tombstones
are written to
_deletes/(Iceberg: logged there too) so your pipeline can act on them, but removing the data from files already exported is your responsibility: rewrite or compact the affected partitions with your lake’s tooling, or rely on lifecycle rules that expire old files. Files are partitioned byvertical=/resource_type=/dt=; theconnection_idcolumn identifies the rows. - Masked exports still count. A destination without
includePiimasks names, emails and other PII, buthmac-masked values are pseudonymous, not anonymous, and free-text fields may still carry personal data.
See destinations § Deletions and § Erasure.
Console users (your own staff)
Section titled “Console users (your own staff)”The steps above cover your tenants’ customers. A request from someone who
signs in to the admin console concerns admin-api’s admin.db instead
(admin_store v7):
| Store | What it holds | Removed by |
|---|---|---|
users.email, users.email_source |
Their email address, and whether an admin set it (manual) or the IdP did (idp) |
Clear it on Admin → Users → the user (or PATCH /api/users/:id with "email": null), or delete the user |
user_avatars |
Their profile picture, stored as uploaded or fetched | Remove on the user page or their own My profile page (DELETE /api/users/:id/avatar), or delete the user: deleteUser removes the picture in the same transaction |
An email or picture that came from your identity provider is copied again at
the user’s next SSO sign-in or SCIM update, so remove it at the IdP, or
deprovision the user there, first. The email is never written to the audit
log (only emailSet / emailChanged flags are), and LOG_REDACT_PATHS
redacts email and *.email in every service’s logs. Audit rows keep the
user id of whoever acted.
Verifying
Section titled “Verifying”# The customer is gone (404):curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" "$BASE/v1/customers/<id>"# Their connections are gone:curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" "$BASE/v1/connections"# Audit trail shows the deletes:# Admin → Audit log → filter target_id = <connection id>opensteward.dev ·Plans and free license ·Terms ·Privacy ·support@opensteward.dev
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